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Abstract
Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection
measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epi-
demic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more
self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more
often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting
effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is
increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive ex-
ternality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show
how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we dis-
cuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred)
by a social planner.
1 Introduction
This note considers an economy where citizens enjoy going outside the house,
though this increases the risk of catching, and spreading, a disease. In this
economy, we examine the impact on welfare of a compulsory self-protection
regulatory measure, such as wearing a mask in public. While several countries
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have adopted such policies in the hope of limiting infection rates for the
COVID-19, this note calls for a detailed analysis of these policies.
One may first wonder why governments interfere in self-protection deci-
sions that are normally left to individual sovereignty. Therefore, the first
issue to be clarified is the dual role of a mask: it protects the wearer from
being infected by others, but it may also protect others from being infected
by the wearer. The latter is a positive externality that justifies a public
intervention.
A second step is to take into account that agents adapt their behavior to
the regulatory measure. Indeed, since wearing a protective mask decreases
the risk that an individual catches the disease, it may in turn incite this
individual to go more often outside, or more generally to increase his exposure
to risk. This offsetting effect refers to the well-known Peltzman (1975)’s
article about car seatbelts. This effect by itself cannot reduce the individual’s
welfare since the risk exposure (e.g., the time spent outside the house, or the
driving speed of the car) is optimally chosen by the individual.
Things become even more complex when taking into account the collective
nature of an epidemic. Indeed, the probability that an agent becomes infected
depends not only on the time he spends outside, but also on how much time
other agents spend outside. This generates a “collective offsetting effect”:
since everybody has an extra incentive to go outside when wearing a mask, it
becomes theoretically possible that such a compulsory increase in individual
self-protection eventually hurts welfare (even if masks are costless), once
these behavioral responses are taken into account.
In this note, we develop a model to evaluate these different effects, in
the spirit of Hoy and Polborn (2015) (see the related literature below). A
key role is played by the probability of being infected, which depends on
four variables: the agent’s choice of risk-exposure (i.e., how much time spent
outside), the agent’s compulsory level of self-protection, and the same two
variables averaged across the general population.
Our paper uses a particular (but fairly general) parametrization of this
probability of infection to characterize the risk and welfare consequences of a
policy mandate that individuals adopt a level of self-protection. Superficially,
it might seem obvious that: (i) mandating protection will lower aggregate
risk; and (ii) because of the externalities, a mandate will, at the margin,
improve welfare. The paper shows that neither (i) nor (ii) is true, in general.
More specifically, we obtain two main results. First, whether an increase
in the mandatory level of self-protection reduces or increases the equilibrium
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probability of infection depends only on the value of the demand elasticity
of risk-exposure with respect to the marginal probability of getting infected.
The generality of this result is striking, and it vindicates the view that be-
haviors matter more than technologies. Indeed, the equilibrium effect on the
probability of infection does not depend on the protection offered by a mask,
to the mask wearer or to other agents, or on how frequently people meet
when they spend time outside.
Second, we characterize when public incentives for self-protection exceed
private incentives. This is the case in particular when the above elasticity is
not too high (so that the collective offsetting effect is not too strong), and
self-protection is asymmetrical, i.e., the benefits from wearing a mask are
borne by other agents more than by the wearer.
A general conclusion is that a public policy that relies only on mandatory
self-protection may turn out to be ineffective, or even counter-productive.
This may explain why public policies against the current pandemic often rely
both on mandatory mask wearing, and on social distancing (or lockdowns).
We also note that these results may help to evaluate the impacts of other self-
protection devices such as seatbelts in transport, helmets in sports (Schelling
1973), or the use of condoms or anti-infection drugs (such as the PrEP for
HIV) in health for instance.
1.1 Related literature
Peltzman (1975) provides support for the idea that people adjust their be-
havior in response to the perceived level of risk, becoming less careful if they
feel more protected. He shows empirically that imposing seatbelts to drivers
led to an increase in the number of car accidents, thus offsetting the benefit of
the reduction in accident severity. Similarly, Viscusi (1984) examines the im-
pact of a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s regulation imposing child
resistant packaging on drugs, and provides evidence that parents reacted by
increasing children’s access to drugs. In a recent contribution, Chong and
Restrepo (2017) review the empirical literature on the Peltzman effect.
Hoy and Polborn (2015) study the impact of a better self-protection tech-
nology in a general strategic model with externalities. They derive conditions
on the model’s primitives under which an improved technology increases or
decreases players’ equilibrium utilities. We extend their analysis by com-
paring private and public incentives to self-protect, and by considering that
self-protection may also help protect others (as is the case with masks).
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Gossner and Picard (2005) also study the value of an improvement in risk
protection (i.e., road safety) in the presence of an offsetting effect. However,
in their model, the interaction across agents does not come from individual
self-protection efforts, but from a financial externality through the insurance
market.
Finally, several papers (e.g., Shogren and Crocker 1991, Muermann and
Kunreuther 2008, Lohse et al. 2012) examine a collective self-protection
model where the probability that an agent faces a damage depends on his
own as well as others’ actions as a result of a Nash equilibrium. However,
these papers do not specifically study how a better self-protection technology
affects this probability, and in turn affects the agents’ behavioral response
and welfare.
2 A simple model
Preferences For a representative individual, the basic trade-off is between
spending time  outside the house, with utility (), and reducing the prob-
ability  of being infected, with a utility cost that we normalize to one. The
self-protection level  allows to reduce this probability, but it is costly. Over-
all, an agent’s preferences are represented by the following function of four
variables:
()− ()− ( )
We assume that  is strictly concave, and that  is weakly convex, with
suitable Inada conditions. The key role is played by the probability function
. It is assumed twice differentiable. It increases with the choice of risk-
exposure , and also with the other agents’ choice  of the same variable.
Similarly, it is reduced by the self-protection effort , and also by the other
agents’ self-protection efforts . We make the following functional form
assumption:
Assumption 1 Let ( ) = +1() with   ≥ 0, and func-
tion   0 decreasing in both arguments.
One justification is as follows. The variables  and  determine the
number of meetings, or interactions, between the agent under consideration,
and the other agents. A multiplicative form is natural, as is assumed in
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many matching models, or in simple epidemiological models such as the S-
I-R model (see Garibaldi et al., 2020.) The latter model typically focuses
on the linear case when  = 0 and  = 1, and we slightly generalize it to
allow for non-linearities. The function  is not necessarily symmetrical: one
may protect others by wearing a mask, without being protected from others’
infections.1 The relative importance of these two effects will be measured by
the ratio . This ratio may be high for masks, but it may take different
values for other decisions such as wearing gloves (probably a low value for
this ratio) or washing his hands (maybe a more symmetric case in which the
ratio is close to one). We do not claim expertise here. Our contribution will
be to show that this ratio plays a key role in the study of efficient policies.
Remarks on self-insurance vs. self-protection Under the general form
()− ()− ( )
there is no distinction between self-insurance and self-protection. Indeed,
 can be interpreted as the product between the probability of an accident
and the loss in utility associated to this accident. Therefore, whether a
multiplicative shock impacts the probability or the loss is irrelevant: the
comparative statics exercise is formally identical.
A related remark is that the two decisions  and  play symmetrical roles,
and in fact (−) can be seen as a costly self-protection effort.2 We only depart
from this symmetrical approach when we formulate Assumption 1, which is
based on an analysis of infection probabilities, and not on an evaluation of
damages; and when we consider that the policy imposes a mandatory level
for , and not for .
Individual decisions Given his environment, as characterized by the val-
ues of  and , an agent chooses  and  by maximizing utility, with two
first-order conditions (subscripts denote partial derivatives):
0() = ( ) − 0()− ( ) = 0 (1)
1Note that the degree of self-protection  is modeled as a continuous variable. For
masks, one may think about the proportion of time when a mask is worn, or about an
approximation for the existence of various types of masks (e.g., home made cloth masks,
surgical masks or N95 respirators). Note that in general when a mask is more protective
to the wearer, it is also more protective to other agents.
2We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
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The second first-order condition is active only when  is not a compulsory
requirement, namely when  is a voluntary decision made by the individual.
It will be used to compare private and public incentives for self-protection.
The first condition defines a choice  as a function of ; this function is
increasing. This emphasizes an individual offsetting effect: a higher level
of self-protection makes the agent increase his exposure to risk (this effect
is quite general and does not depend on the specific functional form in As-
sumption 1.) This condition also invites us to define  as the elasticity of the
risk-exposure  with respect to the marginal probability of infection , by
the equality:
 = − 
0()
00() 
3 Policy and equilibrium
Consider a continuum of identical agents, with the above preferences. A
social planner imposes the value of the self-protection effort  to some man-
date , so that  =  = .3 Each agent reacts accordingly by choosing , as
explained above. Because each such choice depends on the other agents’ av-
erage choice , one has to characterize a Nash equilibrium. Under standard
regularity assumptions, and in particular under Assumption 1, there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium () for each value of , and it is characterized by
the following equality:
0(()) = (() ()  ) (2)
It is easily checked (see the Appendix) that under Assumption 1, ()
is increasing with . This is the collective offsetting effect: when everybody
wears a mask, everybody goes outside more often, and the equilibrium orga-
nizes all these decisions in a consistent way.
3For the sake of simplicity, we do not allow the agents to go beyond the mandate by
choosing   . This avoids studying a system of two first-order conditions, and this
allows us to reduce the number and complexity of assumptions. For the same reason, we
do not study corner solutions, by assuming Inada conditions.
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3.1 Effect of the policy on the equilibrium probability
of infection
The equilibrium probability of infection
∗() ≡ (() ()  )
depends on the policy , as follows:
∗
 () = ( + ) + ( + )
0()
The first term in parenthesis is negative: it is the direct effect of imposing
 to all agents. But the second term is the collective offsetting effect, and
it goes in the opposite direction. Using Assumption 1, we can provide a
clearcut result, as follows:4
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium probability of infection
∗ decreases with the compulsory self-protection effort  if and only if the
elasticity of risk-exposure with respect to the probability of infection is less
than one, i.e.   1.
The idea that equilibrium infection rates are impacted by individual be-
haviors is intuitive: if behaviors react strongly to a mandate on masks, these
rates may even increase. What is remarkable is that in equilibrium, only
these behaviors matter, as captured by the elasticity . For example, in the
knife-edged case () = (), so that  = 1, the mandate has absolutely no
effect on the equilibrium rates of infection. More generally, the equilibrium
rates of infection do not depend on the cost of masks, on whether they are
effective to protect oneself or others, or on the particularities of the meeting
process, as captured by the values of  and . This result therefore under-
lines the fundamental role of behaviors, in contrast with technologies. It calls
for more empirical investigations of the value of the elasticity .
3.2 Public vs. private incentives for self-protection
In a welfarist vision of the world, a public policy should aim at maximizing
welfare, which is in general not equivalent to minimizing the probability of
infection. Here, welfare is
 () = (())− ()− (() ()  )
4The proofs of the Propositions are given in the Appendix.
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so that, thanks to the envelope theorem:
 0() = (−0()− ) + (− − 0()) (3)
The first two terms measure the private incentive for self-protection, as
observed in the paragraph on individual decisions (see (1)). The public policy
should support or deter self-protection, according to the sign of the remaining
terms. The direct effect (−) is positive: this is the positive externality
of wearing a mask, normally justifying a public policy. But the collective
offsetting effect (due to others’ reaction) goes once more in the opposite
direction: masks lead people to increase their risk-exposure.
To go further, we use our assumption regarding the shape of the proba-
bility. We obtain:
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, public policy should support manda-
tory self-protection if and only if the following inequality holds:

 + 1 

 ( )
The left-hand side is a measure of the elasticity of behavior. In particular,
when the probability of infection is simply proportional to  (i.e.,  = 0) and
 (i.e.,  = 1), then this term reduces to the elasticity . The right-hand
side is the ratio of the strength of the positive externality , to the strength
of the self-protection effect . In a symmetrical case, the two effects are
equivalent, and then we would be back to the inequality   1. To illustrate
the inequality, we further discuss a few simple cases.
The case when individuals do not react When risk-exposure is fixed,
approximated here by  → 0, then the positive externality alone (  0)
justifies a public support to self-protection. More generally, a decrease in 
favors public support.
The case when the offsetting effect is purely individual This case
corresponds to a probability of infection that does not depend on , i.e.
 = 0. In that case, a public policy is also justified.5 The effect on the
5It may seem strange at first that public policy is justified even if others’ risk exposure
does not affect its own infection probability. However, note that there are still externalities
through others’ self-protection choices , justifying policy intervention.
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probability of infection still depends on the same comparison of  to 1. More
generally, a decrease in  increases public support. This case also emphasizes
the opposing effect of  and , namely the parameters that control the impact
of others’ and its own risk exposure choices on the infection probability.
The case when self-protection does not protect others In standard
self-protection cases, such as for seatbelts or helmets, there is no positive
externality associated with self-protection, i.e.  = 0.6 In those cases,
public policy should not support individual self-protection, but rather deter
it in fact. This holds as soon as there is a strictly positive collective offsetting
effect through   0, which makes everyone increasing risk-exposure at an
over-optimal collective level.
3.3 The first-best case
We conclude the analysis with a remark about the first-best case, i.e., when
the social planner can choose both  and . This case is defined by maxi-
mizing over  and  the social objective
()− ()− (   )
with the following two first-order conditions:
0()−  −  = 0 − 0()−  −  = 0 (4)
It is useful to compare these conditions to those derived precedently when
the social planner can only control . The extra negative term (−) in the
first condition in (4) compared to (2) emphasizes that the first-best policy
accounts for the negative externality induced by going outside, thus putting
a downward pressure on . Moreover, observe that the second condition in
(4) does not contain the negative term (−0()) exhibited in the second-
best policy (see (3)). This is because there is no collective offsetting effect
in the first-best policy, which puts an upward pressure on  compared to the
second-best policy. Overall, one expects a higher value for  and a lower
value for  in the first-best, compared to the case we have studied so far in
6We exclude here the externalities passing through the health system.
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which the social planner could not control ,7 and thus a reduction in the
infection probability.
4 Conclusion
We have discussed whether individual self-protection measures should be
publicly encouraged in a situation where self-protection induces both exter-
nalities and offsetting effects. We have shown that this should be the case
when the collective offsetting effect is not too strong. We have also shown
that this depends on the respective strength of the two-sided impact of self-
protection: protecting oneself and protecting others.
We finally emphasize several assumptions of our analysis that limit its
practical policy relevance in face of an epidemic such as COVID-19. First,
we assume in Propositions 1 and 2 that the government can control indi-
vidual self-protection measures such as wearing a mask in public but cannot
control individual risk-exposure such as the time spent outside their home
by citizens. Hence, we essentially consider a post-lockdown economy where
people can go outside freely, and in which (costly) masks are made available
and possibly compulsory for everyone. As discussed in subsection 3.3, this is
sub-optimal, and one can interpret our results as showing that a simultaneous
regulation of both social distancing (lower ) and mask-wearing (higher )
has clear advantages when individual behavior responds to incentives (high
elasticities).
Second, we assume that individuals correctly perceive the risks. Yet, if
the public for instance overestimate the efficacy of the mask as a protective
technology, individuals may mistakenly over-expose themselves to the risk
because of a “feeling of safety”. This may call for public intervention (Salanié
and Treich, 2009), or for information campaigns that may be effective when
citizens hold incorrect beliefs. Our model suggests in particular a novel
misperception channel: an individual might misestimate the key ratio ,
for instance by believing that wearing a mask protects him while it mostly
protects others.
Third, as in Hoy and Polborn (2015), we consider a continuum of identical
agents. In particular, we do not keep track of the health status (susceptible
7Note that the observation of these effects from a one-to-one comparison of each first-
order condition is not enough to compare the optimal levels of  and  under the first-
and second-best policies. This comparison is complex and left for future research.
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or infected) of agents. An extension to heterogeneity in a static context,
along the lines of Hoffmann and Rothschild (2019), is an interesting topic
that we leave for future research. Furthermore, embedding the analysis in
a fully dynamic epidemiological model would be interesting but also much
more complex.8
Finally, there are certainly other (positive) externalities associated with
going outside during an epidemic. The deployment of masks in public areas
and workplaces may help the global economy restart with benefits for all
(Polyakova et al. 2020). Hence, our study only enlightens a few specific
facets of a much broader and complex economic problem.
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Proof Appendix:
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 simplify the general equations in the
text, by applying Assumption 1. The Nash equilibrium outcome () is
characterized by
0(()) = ( + 1)()+( )
so that, using obvious simplifying notations, the derivative 0() is given by:
0() £00 − ( + 1)( + )()+−1¤ = ( + 1)()+( + )
Now, from the definition of  and the first-order condition, one has
00 = − 
0
() = −

() = −
1
( + 1)()
+−1
so that
0()
∙
−1 − ( + )
¸
= () +  
Because () is decreasing with both arguments, this shows that ()
is increasing. The derivative of the probability ∗ with respect to  is
()+1+( + ) + ( + 1 + )()+0()
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and has the same sign as
()( + )(1 +  + )− ( + 1 + )()
 + 

which has the same sign as
 + 1 +  − (1 +  + ) = 1−
1
 
This shows Proposition 1. For Proposition 2, the difference between pub-
lic and private first-order conditions equals
− − 0() = ()+[−() − 0()]
which has the same sign as
−(1 +  + ) + ( + )
from which we get the inequality in the Proposition.
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